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RECENT DECISIONS
Contracts - Covenants not to Compete - The plaintiff, a bar-
ber supply company, employed the defendant in 1945 as as salesman
in the states of North and South Carolina, and "particularly in the east-
ern parts of said states." The defendant, at the time of his employment,
contracted upon termination of employment:
"Not to own, operate any company or business selling same type
of merchandise in the stipulated territory (states of North and
South Carolina and particularly in the eastern part) for a period
of 5 years . . . not to contract any account handling this same
type of merchandise either in person or in writing or by tele-
phone, and by acceptance of employment under contract."
The defendant terminated the contract in 1947 and subsequently en-
tered the employment of a competitor of the plaintiff who carried on
a similar business in the same area. The defendant even solicited trade
from the buyers he had sold goods to while in the plaintiff's employ.
The plaintiff attempted to enjoin the defendant from soliciting in the
stipulated area. The defendant raised the defense that this was an un-
reasonable restraint of employment and consequently void. Plaintiff
failed to prove that its area of established business was as great as the
area of contract restriction. Held: the contract area of restriction was
unreasonable because plaintiff had failed to prove an established busi-
ness commensurate with the contract area. The Court refused to sustain
the restriction even insofar as the area of plaintiff's established business
or the area of defendant's personal contacts, thus rejecting the doctrine
of severability. Noe v. McDevitt, 45 S.E. (2d) 121 North Carolina,
(1948).
Early common law held such restrictive covenants void prima facie
as a restraint of trade, until the Reynolds- case distinguished between
total and partial restraints of trade. The latter were permissible if
based upon good consideration, not contrary to public policy, and ancil-
lary to sale of business or dissolution of a partnership.2 Today, nega-
tive covenants in restraint of employment are treated as a partial re-
straint of trade. However, there is a growing tenden'y in the courts
to adopt the English distinction between covenants in partial restraint
of trade and those in restraint of employment." The latter the courts
are reluctant to enforce.4
1 Mitchell v. Reynolds, I.P. Wins. 18 (1711), where the covenant at issue was
declared void but the distinction was laid down.
2 Williston, Contracts, (Rev. Ed.) sec. 1637 (1937) ; Coker v. Rickey, 104 Ore.
14, 202 P. 551, 22 A.L.R. 744 (1921).
8 Samuel Stores v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 A. 54, 9 A.L.R. 145 (1919);
Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 101, 52 A.L.R. 1356 (1919);
McCleur v. Super Maid Cook Ware Corp., 62 F.(2d) 426 (1926), where Taft
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The judicial enforceability of negative covenants in restraint of em-
ployment is now generally determined by the test of reasonableness. 5
The courts consider three major factors in applying the test: (1) the
right and necessity of the employer's protection of his business from
the employee; (2) the restraint of the employee's right to earn a live-
lihood; and (3) the effect upon the public.6 Wisconsin seems to con-
sider the probability of the employee becoming a public charge as con-
trolling in some instances.7 It is well settled that where the restraint
unreasonably exceeds the necessary requirements it is void for that rea-
son alone.8 The old common law requirement of definite limitations
as to space and time is now disregarded if the restraint is reasonable
under the above three factors."
The test of reasonableness generally turns on the area or the ter-
ritory from which the employee is restrained." If an employee has
acquired knowledge in the nature of a trade secret," or if the covenant
accompanies a sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership, 12 the
majority rule determines the area of reasonable restraint to be the area
of established business, and if the covenant exceeds this area it will not
be enforced..3 In cases where a salesman is involved, unless he uses
J. lays down all -permissible restraints of trade in which he includes restraints
of employment:
1. Any seller of property or business not to compete with buyer in such a
way as to derogate from the value of the property or business sold.
2. Any retiring partner not to compete with the existing firm.
3. Any partner pending partnership not to do anything to interfere by
competition or otherwise with the firm or business.
4. Any buyer of property not to use the same in competition with business
retained by seller.
5. Any assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his master or em-
ployer, at expiration of his service.4 Annotation, 152 A.L.R. 415 (1944) discusses the problem and lists cases both
ways.
5Restatement of Contracts sec. 515, 516, 517, (1932); Kadis v. Britt, 29
S.E.(2d) 543, 152 A.L.R. 405 (1944); Mil. Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 210 Wis.
467, 246 N.W. 567 (1933), adopts the reasonable test laid down by the Restate-
ment; Heckard v. Park, 164 Kan. 216, 186 P.(2d) 936, 175 A.L.R. 605 (1948).
6 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 218 Ind. 245, 195 N.E. 277, 98 A.L.R. 958
(1938); Milgram v. Milgram, 105 Ind. App. 57, 12 N.E.(2d) 394 (1938);
Tobacco Growers Co-op v. Jones, 185 N.C.(2d) 265, 33 A.L.R. 958 (1924);
Mil. Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, note 5, supra.7 Mil. Linen Supply, note 5, supra; 18 Iowa L. Rev. 546 (1932) ; 17 Marq. L.
Rev. 94 (1932); 9 Wis. L. Rev. 14 (1933).
8 Restatement, note 5, supra, sec. 514, 515(b) ; Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas,
291 Mass. 176, 196 N.E. 856, noted 15 B.U. L. Rev. 834 (1935) ; 22 Va. L. Rev.
94; Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (1851), wherever restraint is larger than
necessary for protection of a party it is unreasonable and consequently void.
s Williston, note 2, supra, sec. 1639 for authorities.
10 29 Ky. L. J. 110, (1940) discusses the test of reasonableness as to territory.
1Restatement of Agency, sec. 396 (1933), as to the knowledge of agent of the
principal's business; Williston, note 2, supra, see. 1643, note 4.
12 General Bronze v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 245 N.W. 589 (1932) that on a
sale of the business restraint is reasonable to the extent of the business good
will, and may be nation-wide; Annotation 94 A.L.R. 345 (1934).
13 Williston, sec. 1646, note 7, supra.
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written customer lists or possesses knowledge in the nature of trade
secrets, 14 he is placed in the category of a mere servant and the majority
rule will not permit him to be restricted. Thus, if the employer cannot
prove both that his employee possesses trade secrets and that the con-
tract area is limited to the area of established business, he will be left
without remedy. The doctrine of severability does not save the covenant
to any extent because if the court finds that the employee does not
possess knowledge so as to endanger the employer's business, the
employer has nothing to fear from the employee in any area. The
doctrine of severability could be applied where there is special knowl-
edge and the contract area exceeds the established business area, but
the courts refuse to save the covenant to the extent of the established
business unless the contract terms provide a basis for severability, be-
ing reluctant to remake the contract.'15
New York and Wisconsin recognize an intermediate ground in
employment restrictions of salesmen and solicitors, where a personal
relationship exists between the employer's customers and the salesmen.
In these cases the theory is that the sales follow the salesman and the
employer needs protection to the extent of the employee's activities.
New York holds that such covenants are independent and will enforce
them almost in any case where the employer shows need of such pro-
tection and has exacted such a covenant from his employee.' 6 Wiscon-
sin also recognizes this personal relationship and states explicitly that
such a restraint is reasonable to the extent of the employee's activities.'
In cases where the contract area exceeds the area of the salesman's ac-
tivities Wisconsin will sever it so as to make it reasonable and give
the employer necessary protection. It is therefore clear that the per-
sonal contact rule permits the employer to restrict the salesman or so-
licitor from doing business with customers after he has terminated his
employment.
The North Carolina court in attempting to apply the majority rule
in the principal case disregards the personal relationship existing be-
tween the salesman and the employer's customers and the necessity of
protecting the employer's business from this personal contact, leaving
14 Cases collected pro and contra in 54 A.L.R. 343 (1928).
159 Wis. L. Rev. 310 (1934), discusses the doctrine of severability as applied
to covenants in restraint of employment.16 Briggs v. Clover, 254 App. Div. 619, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 79 (1938), where employee
was hostess and solicited contracts from customers; 9 A.L.R. 1146 (1919)
equity cases where employee was restrained because he gained knowledge and
personal contact with the customers; Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 118 Fla. 137,
160 So. 32 (1935).17 Wisconsin Ice and Coal v. Leuth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933), Wickem
J. "It is generally proper for the employer, to exact a covenant not to com-
pete in such territory as may constitute the field of the employee's activities,
but the covenant can go no farther."
[Vol. 32
RECENT DECISIONS
the employer without remedy at law or in equity. The personal contact
rule seems to be the better reasoned rule and more desirable for it
recognizes and protects the economic interests of both the employer
and the employee.
EARL A. CHARLTON
Taxation - Cancellation of Gift for Mistake of Law - Plaintiff
made a gift to his wife of stock in a corporation that he and another
controlled. Subsequently, the corporation was dissolved and a limited
partnership of husbands and wives was formed to which each conveyed
an undivided interest in the tangible assets received by them in the
liquidation. In 1942, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed
the income received by the wife from the partnership to the plaintiff,
and the position of the Commissioner was sustained by the courts.'
Plaintiff then sought to have the gift rescinded in equity on the ground
that it was made under a mistaken interpretation of the income tax
law. Held: that plaintiff made the gift to his wife for the purpose of
creating a separate estate in her name as well as for its tax-saving
effect, and under such circumstances a court of equity will not rescind
the gift. Lowry v. Kavanaugh, et al, 34 N.W. (2d) 60 (Michigan,
(1948).
The plaintiff relied on a previous Michigan decision in Stone v.
Stone2 where the court allowed rescission of a similar gift made in a
misguided effort to save taxes. In that case, parents transferred in trust
for their minor children undivided shares in a family partnership be-
lieving that the income arising thereon would be taxed separately to the
children for federal income tax purposes. The Stone decision seemed
quite liberal, but the Court in the instant case distinguished it on this
ground: in Stone the only purpose of the gift was the expected tax
saving, whereas in the present case the main purpose was to create a
separate and independent estate in the wife, the tax-saving motive
being only secondary. The Court in the Stone case, after reviewing the
facts, concluded that there was involved "no compromise of doubtful
legal rights, no question of the rights to retain the benefits of a bargain,
and no circumstance making restitution inequitable to the donees or
inexpedient because opposed to public interests". In the instant case,
the Court reasoned that there were circumstances which would make
restitution inequitable. The donor in his testimony stated that he made
this gift because he wanted his wife to have property of her own in-
dependent of his, which she could do with as she pleased. To return
' Tower v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532, 90 L. Ed. 670, 164 AL.R.
1135 (1946).
2 Stone v. Stone, 319 Mich. 194, 29 N.W.(2d) 271 (1947).
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